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Abstract
We study the utility maximization problem for power utility ran-
dom fields in a semimartingale financial market, with and without
intermediate consumption. The notion of an opportunity process is
introduced as a reduced form of the value process of the resulting
stochastic control problem. We show how the opportunity process
describes the key objects: optimal strategy, value function, and dual
problem. The results are applied to obtain monotonicity properties of
the optimal consumption.
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1 Introduction
We consider the utility maximization problem in a semimartingale model
for a financial market, with and without intermediate consumption. While
the model is general, we focus on power utilities. If the maximization is
seen as a stochastic control problem, the homogeneity of these utilities leads
to a factorization of the value process into a power of the current wealth
and a process L around which our analysis is built. This corresponds to
the usual factorization of the value function in a Markovian setting. The
process L is called opportunity process as Lt encodes the conditional expected
utility that can be attained from time t. This name was introduced by
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Černý and Kallsen [1] in the context of mean-variance hedging for an object
that is analogous, although introduced in a different way by those authors.
Surprisingly, there exists no general study of L for the case of power utility,
which is a gap we try to fill here.
The opportunity process is a suitable tool to derive qualitative results
about the optimal consumption strategy. Indeed, we first establish the con-
nection between L and the solution Ŷ of the convex-dual problem. Since
Ŷ is related to the optimal consumption by the marginal utility, this leads
to a feedback formula for the optimal consumption in terms of L for gen-
eral semimartingale models. Previous results in this direction (see Stoikov
and Zariphopoulou [25]) required a Markovian model and the verification of
a solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Via the feedback for-
mula, seemingly abstract results about the opportunity process translate to
properties of the optimal consumption which are of direct economic interest.
In particular, we derive monotonicity properties and bounds that are quite
explicit despite the generality of the model.
The present paper combines tools from convex duality and dynamic pro-
gramming to study the utility maximization problem from a “global” point
of view. The study of the local structure requires a more computational
approach presented in a companion paper [21] and yields, in particular, a
formula for the optimal trading strategy in terms of the opportunity pro-
cess. That formula cannot be obtained by the abstract arguments of the
present paper. However, its derivation requires the structures that we intro-
duce here, and therefore some details in our exposition are motivated by the
requirements of the companion paper.
This paper is organized as follows. After the introduction, we discuss
power utility random fields and specify the optimization problem in detail.
Section 3 introduces the opportunity process L via dynamic programming
and examines its basic properties. Section 4 relates L to convex duality the-
ory and reverse Hölder inequalities, which is useful to obtain bounds for the
opportunity process. Section 5 contains the feedback formula and the appli-
cations to the study of the optimal consumption. Section 6 completes the
picture by a brief description of the formula for the optimal trading strategy.
Two appendices supply the necessary results about dynamic programming
and duality theory.
We refer to Jacod and Shiryaev [8] for unexplained notation.
2 The Optimization Problem
Financial Market. We fix the time horizon T ∈ (0,∞) and a filtered
probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P ) satisfying the usual assumptions of
right-continuity and completeness, as well as F0 = {∅,Ω} P -a.s. We consider
an Rd-valued càdlàg semimartingale R with R0 = 0. The (componentwise)
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stochastic exponential S = E(R) represents the discounted price processes
of d risky assets, while R stands for their returns. Our agent also has a bank
account paying zero interest at his disposal.
Trading Strategies and Consumption. The agent is endowed with a
deterministic initial capital x0 > 0. A trading strategy is a predictable R-
integrable Rd-valued process π, where the ith component is interpreted as
the fraction of wealth (or the portfolio proportion) invested in the ith risky
asset. A consumption strategy is a nonnegative optional process c such that∫ T
0 ct dt < ∞ P -a.s. We want to consider two cases. Either consumption
occurs only at the terminal time T (utility from “terminal wealth” only);
or there is intermediate consumption plus a bulk consumption at the time
horizon. To unify the notation, we define the measure µ on [0, T ] by
µ(dt) :=
{
0 in the case without intermediate consumption,
dt in the case with intermediate consumption.
We also define µ◦ := µ + δ{T}, where δ{T} is the unit Dirac measure at T .
The wealth process X(π, c) corresponding to a pair (π, c) is described by the
linear equation
Xt(π, c) = x0 +
∫ t
0
Xs−(π, c)πs dRs −
∫ t
0
cs µ(ds), 0 ≤ t ≤ T (2.1)
and the set of admissible trading and consumption pairs is
A(x0) =
{
(π, c) : X(π, c) > 0, X−(π, c) > 0 and cT = XT (π, c)
}
.
The convention cT = XT (π, c) means that all the remaining wealth is con-
sumed at time T ; it is merely for notational convenience. Indeed, X(π, c)
does not depend on cT , hence any given consumption strategy c can be rede-
fined to satisfy cT = XT (π, c). We fix the initial capital x0 and usually write
A for A(x0). A consumption strategy c is called admissible if there exists π
such that (π, c) ∈ A; we write c ∈ A for brevity. The meaning of π ∈ A is
analogous.
Sometimes it is convenient to parametrize the consumption strategies as
fractions of wealth. Let (π, c) ∈ A and let X = X(π, c) be the corresponding
wealth process. Then
κ :=
c
X
(2.2)
is called the propensity to consume corresponding to (π, c). Note that κT = 1
due to our convention that cT = XT .
Remark 2.1. (i) The parametrization (π, κ) allows to express wealth pro-
cesses as stochastic exponentials: by (2.1),
X(π, κ) = x0E
(
π • R− κ • µ
)
(2.3)
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coincides with X(π, c) for κ := c/X(π, c), where we have used that the
càdlàg property implies X(π, c) = X(π, c)− µ-a.e. The symbol • indicates
an integral, e.g., π • R =
∫
πs dRs.
(ii) Relation (2.2) induces a one-to-one correspondence between the pairs
(π, c) ∈ A and the pairs (π, κ) such that π ∈ A and κ is a nonnegative
optional process satisfying
∫ T
0 κs ds < ∞ P -a.s. and κT = 1. Indeed, given
(π, c) ∈ A, define κ by (2.2) with X = X(π, c). As X,X− > 0 and as X
is càdlàg, almost every path of X is bounded away from zero and κ has
the desired integrability. Conversely, given (π, κ), define X via (2.3) and
c := κX; then X = X(π, c). From admissibility we deduce π⊤∆R > −1 up
to evanescence, which in turn shows X > 0. Now X− > 0 by a standard
property of stochastic exponentials [8, II.8a], so (π, c) ∈ A.
Preferences. Let D be a càdlàg adapted strictly positive process such that
E
[ ∫ T
0 Ds µ
◦(ds)
]
< ∞ and fix p ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1). We define the utility
random field
Ut(x) := Dt
1
px
p, x ∈ [0,∞), t ∈ [0, T ],
where 1/0 := ∞. We remark that Zariphopoulou [27] and Tehranchi [26]
have previously used utility functions modified by certain multiplicative ran-
dom variables, in the case where utility is obtained from terminal wealth.
To wit, Ut(x) is any p-homogeneous utility random field such that a con-
stant consumption yields finite expected utility, and therefore the most gen-
eral utility random field that gives rise to the structure studied in this pa-
per. In particular, our results do not apply to the additive specification
U ′t(x) :=
1
p(x+Dt)
p that would correspond to a hedging or random endow-
ment problem, except of course for trivial choices of D.
In the sequel, we will sometimes assume that there are constants k1 and
k2 such that
0 < k1 ≤ Dt ≤ k2, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.4)
The expected utility corresponding to a consumption strategy c ∈ A is
given by E[
∫ T
0 Ut(ct)µ
◦(dt)]. We recall that this is either E[UT (cT )] or
E[
∫ T
0 Ut(ct) dt + UT (cT )]. In the case without intermediate consumption,
Ut is irrelevant for t < T .
Remark 2.2. The process D can be used for discounting utility and con-
sumption, or to determine the weight of intermediate consumption compared
to terminal wealth. Our utility functional can also be related to the usual
power utility function 1px
p in the following ways. If we write
E
[ ∫ T
0
Ut(ct)µ
◦(dt)
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
1
pc
p
t dKt
]
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for dKt := Dt µ◦(dt), we have the usual power utility, but with a stochastic
clock K (cf. Goll and Kallsen [6]). In fact, one could also consider more
general measures dK and obtain a structure similar to our results below.
To model taxation of the consumption, let ̺ > −1 be the tax rate and
D := (1 + ̺)−p. If c represents the cashflow out of the portfolio, c/(1 + ̺)
is the effectively obtained amount of the consumption good, yielding the
instantaneous utility 1p(ct/(1 + ̺t))
p = Ut(ct). Similarly, DT can model a
multiplicative bonus payment.
For yet another alternative, assume either that there is no intermediate
consumption or that D is a martingale, and that E[DT ] = 1. Then
E
[ ∫ T
0
Ut(ct)µ
◦(dt)
]
= EP˜
[ ∫ T
0
1
pc
p
t µ
◦(dt)
]
with the equivalent probability P˜ defined by dP˜ = DT dP . This is the
standard power utility problem for an agent with subjective beliefs, i.e., who
uses P˜ instead of the objective probability P .
We assume that the value of the utility maximization problem is finite:
u(x0) := sup
c∈A(x0)
E
[ ∫ T
0
Ut(ct)µ
◦(dt)
]
<∞. (2.5)
This is a standing assumption for the entire paper. It is void if p < 0
because then U < 0. If p > 0, it needs to be checked on a case-by-
case basis (see also Remark 4.7). A strategy (πˆ, cˆ) ∈ A(x0) is optimal if
E
[ ∫ T
0 Ut(ct)µ
◦(dt)
]
= u(x0). Of course, a no-arbitrage property is required
to guarantee its existence. Let M S be the set of equivalent σ-martingale
measures for S. If
M
S 6= ∅, (2.6)
arbitrage is excluded in the sense of the NFLVR condition (see Delbaen and
Schachermayer [3]). We can cite the following existence result of Karatzas
and Žitković [11]; it was previously obtained by Kramkov and Schacher-
mayer [15] for the case without intermediate consumption.
Proposition 2.3. Under (2.4) and (2.6), there exists an optimal strategy
(πˆ, cˆ) ∈ A. The corresponding wealth process X̂ = X(πˆ, cˆ) is unique. The
consumption strategy cˆ can be chosen to be càdlàg and is unique P ⊗ µ◦-a.e.
In the sequel, cˆ denotes a càdlàg version. We note that under (2.6), the
requirement X(π, c)− > 0 in the definition of A is automatically satisfied
as soon as X(π, c) > 0, because X(π, c) is then a positive supermartingale
under an equivalent measure.
Remark 2.4. In Proposition 2.3, the assumption on D can be weakened
by exploiting that (2.6) is invariant under equivalent changes of measure.
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Suppose that D = D′D′′, where D′ meets (2.4) and D′′ is a martingale
with unit expectation. As in Remark 2.2, we consider the problem under
the probability dP˜ = D′′T dP , then Proposition 2.3 applies under P˜ with D
′
instead of D, and we obtain the existence of a solution also under P .
3 The Opportunity Process
This section introduces the main object under discussion. We do not yet
impose the existence of an optimal strategy, but recall the standing assump-
tion (2.5). To apply dynamic programming, we introduce for each (π, c) ∈ A
and t ∈ [0, T ] the set
A(π, c, t) =
{
(π˜, c˜) ∈ A : (π˜, c˜) = (π, c) on [0, t]
}
. (3.1)
These are the controls available on (t, T ] after having used (π, c) until t. The
notation c˜ ∈ A(π, c, t) means that there exists π˜ such that (π˜, c˜) ∈ A(π, c, t).
Given (π, c) ∈ A, we consider the value process
Jt(π, c) := ess sup
c˜∈A(pi,c,t)
E
[ ∫ T
t
Us(c˜s)µ
◦(ds)
∣∣∣Ft]. (3.2)
We choose the càdlàg version of this process (see Proposition A.2 in the
Appendix). The p-homogeneity of the utility functional leads to the following
factorization of J .
Proposition 3.1. There exists a unique càdlàg semimartingale L, called
opportunity process, such that
Lt
1
p
(
Xt(π, c)
)p
= Jt(π, c) = ess sup
c˜∈A(pi,c,t)
E
[ ∫ T
t
Us(c˜s)µ
◦(ds)
∣∣∣Ft] (3.3)
for any admissible strategy (π, c) ∈ A. In particular, LT = DT .
Proof. Although the statement seems to be well known for several special
cases of our setting, we give a detailed proof in view of the importance for
this paper. Let (π, c), (πˇ, cˇ) ∈ A and X := X(π, c), Xˇ := X(πˇ, cˇ). We claim
that
1
Xˇpt
ess sup
c˜∈A(pˇi,cˇ,t)
E
[ ∫ T
t
Us(c˜s)µ
◦(ds)
∣∣∣Ft] (3.4)
=
1
Xpt
ess sup
c˜∈A(pi,c,t)
E
[ ∫ T
t
Us(c˜s)µ
◦(ds)
∣∣∣Ft].
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Indeed, using the lattice property given in Fact A.1, we can find a sequence
(cn) in A(πˇ, cˇ, t) such that, with a monotone increasing limit,
Xpt
Xˇpt
ess sup
c˜∈A(pˇi,cˇ,t)
E
[ ∫ T
t
Us(c˜s)µ
◦(ds)
∣∣∣Ft] = Xpt
Xˇpt
lim
n
E
[ ∫ T
t
Us(c
n
s )µ
◦(ds)
∣∣∣Ft]
= lim
n
E
[ ∫ T
t
Us
(
Xt
Xˇt
cns
)
µ◦(ds)
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ ess sup
c˜∈A(pi,c,t)
E
[ ∫ T
t
Us(c˜s)µ
◦(ds)
∣∣∣Ft],
where we have used Fact A.3 in the last step. The claim follows by symmetry.
Thus, if we define Lt := Jt(π, c)/
[
1
p
(
Xt(π, c)
)p], L does not depend on the
choice of (π, c) ∈ A and inherits the properties of J(π, c) andX(π, c) > 0.
The opportunity process describes (p times) the maximal amount of
conditional expected utility that can be accumulated on [t, T ] from one
unit of wealth. In particular, the value function (2.5) can be expressed
as u(x) = L0 1px
p.
In a Markovian setting, the factorization of the value function (which
then replaces the value process) is very classical; for instance, it can already
be found in Merton [19]. In that setting there is also a number of cases
where L is known explicitly for the case without intermediate consumption.
See, e.g., Kraft [14] for Heston’s model and Kallsen and Muhle-Karbe [9]
for certain affine models including the CGMY model. For exponential Lévy
models an explicit solution is available also for the case with consumption
(see Example 6.1).
Mania and Tevzadze [18] study power utility from terminal wealth in
a continuous semimartingale model; that paper contains some of the basic
notions used here as well. In fact, the opportunity process is present—in a
more or less explicit form—in almost all works dealing with power utility.
However, since it is impossible to discuss here this vast literature, we confine
ourselves to indicating the most closely related references throughout this
article.
Remark 3.2. Let D be a martingale with D0 = 1 and P˜ as in Remark 2.2.
Bayes’ rule and (3.3) show that L˜ := L/D can be understood as “opportunity
process under P˜ ” for the standard power utility function.
Remark 3.3. We can now formalize the fact that the optimal strategies (in
a suitable parametrization) do not depend on the current level of wealth, a
special feature implied by the choice of power utility. If (πˆ, cˆ) ∈ A is optimal,
X̂ = X(πˆ, cˆ), and κˆ = cˆ/X̂ is the optimal propensity to consume, then (πˆ, κˆ)
defines a conditionally optimal strategy for the problem
ess sup
c˜∈A(pi,c,t)
E
[ ∫ T
t
Us(c˜s)µ
◦(ds)
∣∣∣Ft]; for any (π, c) ∈ A, t ∈ [0, T ].
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To see this, fix (π, c) ∈ A and t ∈ [0, T ]. We define the pair (π¯, c¯) by
π¯ = π1[0,t] + πˆ1(t,T ] and c¯ = c1[0,t] +
Xt(pi,c)
X̂t
cˆ1(t,T ] and let X¯ := X(π¯, c¯).
Note that (πˆ, cˆ) is conditionally optimal in A(πˆ, cˆ, t), as otherwise Fact A.1
yields a contradiction to the global optimality of (πˆ, cˆ). Now (3.4) with
(πˇ, cˇ) := (πˆ, cˆ) shows that (π¯, c¯) is conditionally optimal in A(π, c, t). The
result follows as c¯/X¯ = cˆ/X̂ = κˆ on (t, T ] by Fact A.3.
The martingale optimality principle of dynamic programming takes the
following form in our setting.
Proposition 3.4. Let (π, c) ∈ A be an admissible strategy and assume that
E[
∫ T
0 Us(cs)µ
◦(ds)] > −∞. Then the process
Lt
1
p
(
Xt(π, c)
)p
+
∫ t
0
Us(cs)µ(ds), t ∈ [0, T ]
is a supermartingale; it is a martingale if and only if (π, c) is optimal.
Proof. Combine Proposition 3.1 and Proposition A.2.
The following lemma collects some elementary properties of L. The
bounds are obtained by comparison with no-trade strategies, hence they are
independent of the price process. If D is deterministic or if there are con-
stants k1, k2 > 0 as in (2.4), we obtain bounds which are model-independent;
they depend only on the utility function and the time to maturity.
Lemma 3.5. The opportunity process L is a special semimartingale.
(i) If p ∈ (0, 1), L is a supermartingale satisfying
Lt ≥
(
µ◦[t, T ]
)−p
E
[ ∫ T
t
Ds µ
◦(ds)
∣∣∣Ft], 0 ≤ t ≤ T (3.5)
and L,L− > 0. In particular, L ≥ k1 if D ≥ k1.
(ii) If p < 0, L satisfies
0 ≤ Lt ≤
(
µ◦[t, T ]
)−p
E
[ ∫ T
t
Ds µ
◦(ds)
∣∣∣Ft], 0 ≤ t ≤ T (3.6)
and in particular Lt ≤ k2
(
µ◦[t, T ]
)1−p
if D ≤ k2. In the case without
intermediate consumption, L is a submartingale.
If there exists an optimal strategy (πˆ, cˆ), then L,L− > 0.
Proof. Consider the cases where either p > 0, or p < 0 and there is no
intermediate consumption. Then π ≡ 0, c ≡ x01{T} is an admissible strat-
egy and Proposition 3.4 shows that Lt 1px
p
0 +
∫ t
0 Us(0)µ(ds) = Lt
1
px
p
0 is a
supermartingale, proving the super/submartingale properties in (i) and (ii).
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Let p be arbitrary and assume there is no intermediate consumption.
Applying (3.3) with π ≡ 0 and c ≡ x01{T}, we get Lt 1px
p
0 ≥ E[UT (cT )|Ft] =
E[DT |Ft]
1
px
p
0. Hence Lt ≥ E[DT |Ft] if p > 0 and Lt ≤ E[DT |Ft] if p < 0,
which corresponds to (3.5) and (3.6) for this case.
If there is intermediate consumption (and p is arbitrary), we consume
at a constant rate after the fixed time t. That is, we use (3.3) with π ≡ 0
and c = x0(T − t + 1)−11[t,T ] to obtain Lt
1
px
p
0 ≥ E
[ ∫ T
t Us(cs)µ
◦(ds)
∣∣Ft] =
1
px
p
0(1+T − t)
−pE
[ ∫ T
t Ds µ
◦(ds)
∣∣Ft]. This ends the proof of (3.5) and (3.6).
In the case p < 0, (3.6) shows that L is dominated by a martingale, hence
L is of class (D) and in particular a special semimartingale.
It remains to prove the positivity. If p > 0, (3.5) shows L > 0 and
then L− > 0 follows by the minimum principle for positive supermartin-
gales. For p < 0, let X̂ = X(πˆ, cˆ) be the optimal wealth process. Clearly
L > 0 follows from (3.3) with (πˆ, cˆ). From Proposition 3.4 we have that
1
pX̂
pL+
∫
Us(cˆs)µ(ds) is a negative martingale, hence X̂pL is a positive su-
permartingale. Therefore P [inf0≤t≤T X̂
p
t Lt > 0] = 1 and it remains to note
that the paths of X̂p are P -a.s. bounded because X̂, X̂− > 0.
The following concerns the submartingale property in Lemma 3.5(ii).
Example 3.6. Consider the case with intermediate consumption and assume
that D ≡ 1 and S ≡ 1. Then (πˆ, cˆ) ≡ (0, x0/(1 + T )) is an optimal strategy
and Lt = (1 + T − t)1−p is a decreasing function. In particular, L is not a
submartingale.
Remark 3.7. We can also consider the utility maximization problem under
constraints in the following sense. Suppose that for each (ω, t) ∈ Ω × [0, T ]
we are given a set Ct(ω) ⊆ Rd. We assume that each of these sets contains
the origin. A strategy (π, c) ∈ A is called C -admissible if πt(ω) ∈ Ct(ω) for
all (ω, t), and the set of all these strategies is denoted by AC . We remark
that all results (and their proofs) in this section remain valid if A is replaced
by AC throughout. This generalization is not true for the subsequent section
and existence of an optimal strategy is not guaranteed for general C .
4 Relation to the Dual Problem
We discuss how the problem dual to utility maximization relates to the op-
portunity process L. We assume (2.4) and (2.6) in the entire Section 4,
hence Proposition 2.3 applies. The dual problem will be defined on a do-
main Y introduced below. Since its definition is slightly cumbersome, we
point out that to follow the results in the body of this paper, only two facts
about Y are needed. First, the density process of each martingale measure
Q ∈ M S, scaled by a certain constant y0, is contained in Y . Second, each
element of Y is a positive supermartingale.
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Following [11], the dual problem is given by
inf
Y ∈Y (y0)
E
[ ∫ T
0
U∗t (Yt)µ
◦(dt)
]
, (4.1)
where y0 := u′(x0) = L0x
p−1
0 and U
∗
t is the convex conjugate of x 7→ Ut(x),
U∗t (y) := sup
x>0
{
Ut(x)− xy
}
= −1qy
qDβt . (4.2)
We have denoted by
β :=
1
1− p
> 0, q :=
p
p− 1
∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1) (4.3)
the relative risk tolerance and the exponent conjugate to p, respectively.
These constants will be used very often in the sequel and it is useful to note
sign(p) = − sign(q). It remains to define the domain Y = Y (y0). Let
X = {H • S : H ∈ L(S), H • S is bounded below}
be the set of gains processes from trading. The set of “supermartingale
densities” is defined by
Y
∗ = {Y ≥ 0 càdlàg : Y0 ≤ y0, Y G is a supermartingale for all G ∈ X };
its subset corresponding to probability measures equivalent to P on FT is
Y
M = {Y ∈ Y ∗ : Y > 0 is a martingale and Y0 = y0}.
We place ourselves in the setting of [11] by considering the same dual domain
Y D ⊆ Y ∗. It consists of the density processes of (the regular parts of) the
finitely additive measures contained in the σ((L∞)∗, L∞)-closure of the set
{YT : Y ∈ Y
M } ⊆ L1 ⊆ (L∞)∗. More precisely, we multiply each density
with the constant y0. We refer to [11] for details as the precise construction of
Y D is not important here, it is relevant for us only that Y M ⊆ Y D ⊆ Y ∗. In
particular, y0M S ⊆ Y D if we identify measures and their density processes.
For notational reasons, we make the dual domain slightly smaller and let
Y := {Y ∈ Y D : Y > 0}.
By [11, Theorem 3.10] there exists a unique Ŷ = Ŷ (y0) ∈ Y such that the
infimum in (4.1) is attained, and it is related to the optimal consumption cˆ
via the marginal utility by
Ŷt = ∂x Ut(x)|x=cˆt = Dtcˆ
p−1
t (4.4)
on the support of µ◦. In the case without intermediate consumption, an
existence result was previously obtained in [15].
10
Remark 4.1. All the results stated below remain true if we replace Y by
{Y ∈ Y ∗ : Y > 0}; i.e., it is not important for our purposes whether we use
the dual domain of [11] or the one of [15]. This is easily verified using the
fact that Y D contains all maximal elements of Y ∗ (see [11, Theorem 2.10]).
Here Y ∈ Y ∗ is called maximal if Y = Y ′B, for some Y ′ ∈ Y ∗ and some
càdlàg nonincreasing process B ∈ [0, 1], implies B ≡ 1.
Proposition 4.2. Let (cˆ, πˆ) ∈ A be an optimal strategy and X̂ = X(πˆ, cˆ).
The solution to the dual problem is given by
Ŷ = LX̂p−1.
Proof. As LT = DT and cˆT = X̂T , (4.4) already yields ŶT = LT X̂
p−1
T .
Moreover, by Lemma B.1 in the Appendix, Ŷ has the property that
Zt := ŶtX̂t +
∫ t
0
Ŷscˆs µ(ds) = ŶtX̂t + p
∫ t
0
Us(cˆs)µ(ds)
is a martingale. By Proposition 3.4, Z˜t := LtX̂
p
t + p
∫ t
0 Us(cˆs)µ(ds) is also a
martingale. The terminal values of these martingales coincide, hence Z˜ = Z.
We deduce Ŷ = LX̂p−1 as X̂ > 0.
The formula Ŷ = LX̂p−1 could be used to define the opportunity process
L. This is the approach taken in Muhle-Karbe [20] (see also [9]), where
utility from terminal wealth is considered and the opportunity process is
used as a tool to verify the optimality of an explicit candidate solution.
From a systematic point of view, our approach via the value process has
the advantage that it immediately yields the properties in Lemma 3.5 and
certain monotonicity results (see Section 5).
4.1 The Dual Opportunity Process
Since the function U∗ in the dual problem (4.1) is again homogeneous, we
expect a similar structure as in the primal problem. This is formalized by
the dual opportunity process L∗. Not only is it natural to introduce this
object, it also turns out that in certain situations L∗ is a more convenient
tool than L (e.g., [23]). We define for Y ∈ Y and t ∈ [0, T ] the set
Y (Y, t) :=
{
Y˜ ∈ Y : Y˜ = Y on [0, t]
}
and we recall the constants (4.3) and the standing assumptions (2.4) and (2.6).
Proposition 4.3. There exists a unique càdlàg process L∗, called dual op-
portunity process, such that for all Y ∈ Y and t ∈ [0, T ],
−1qY
q
t L
∗
t = ess inf
Y˜ ∈Y (Y,t)
E
[ ∫ T
t
U∗s (Y˜s)µ
◦(ds)
∣∣∣Ft].
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An alternative description is
L∗t =

ess supY ∈Y E
[ ∫ T
t D
β
s (Ys/Yt)
q µ◦(ds)
∣∣∣Ft] if q ∈ (0, 1),
ess infY ∈Y E
[ ∫ T
t D
β
s (Ys/Yt)
q µ◦(ds)
∣∣∣Ft] if q < 0
and the extrema are attained at Y = Ŷ .
Proof. The fork convexity of Y [11, Theorem 2.10] shows that if Y, Yˇ ∈ Y
and Y˜ ∈ Y (Yˇ , t), then Y 1[0,t) + (Yt/Yˇt)Y˜ 1[t,T ] is in Y (Y, t). It also implies
that if A ∈ Ft and Y 1, Y 2 ∈ Y (Y, t), then Y 11A + Y 21Ac ∈ Y (Y, t). The
proof of the first claim is now analogous to that of Proposition 3.1. The
second part follows by using that L∗ does not depend on Y .
The process L∗ is related to L by a simple power transformation.
Proposition 4.4. Let β = 11−p . Then L
∗ = Lβ.
Proof. The martingale property of Zt := X̂tŶt+
∫ t
0 cˆsŶs µ(ds) from Lemma B.1
implies that X̂tŶt = E[ZT |Ft] −
∫ t
0 cˆsŶs µ(ds) = E
[ ∫ T
t cˆsŶs µ
◦(ds)
∣∣Ft] =
E
[ ∫ T
t D
β
s Ŷ
q
s µ◦(ds)
∣∣Ft], where the last equality is obtained by expressing cˆ
via (4.4). The right hand side equals Ŷ qt L
∗
t by Proposition 4.3; so we have
shown X̂Ŷ = Ŷ qL∗. On the other hand, (LX̂p−1)q = Ŷ q by Proposition 4.2
and this can be written as X̂Ŷ = Ŷ qLβ. We deduce L∗ = Lβ as Ŷ > 0.
4.2 Reverse Hölder Inequality and Boundedness of L
In this section we study uniform bounds for L in terms of inequalities of
reverse Hölder type. This will yield a corresponding result for the optimal
consumption in Section 5 as well as a sufficient condition for (2.5). Moreover,
uniform bounds for L are linked to the existence of bounded solutions for a
certain class of backward stochastic differential equations, as explained in the
companion paper [21]. Since bounded solutions are of particular interest in
the theory of those equations, the detailed treatment below is also motivated
by this link.
Let q = pp−1 be the exponent conjugate to p. Given a general positive
process Y , we consider the following inequality:
∫ T
τ
E
[
(Ys/Yτ )
q
∣∣Fτ ]µ◦(ds) ≤ Cq if q < 0,∫ T
τ
E
[
(Ys/Yτ )
q
∣∣Fτ ]µ◦(ds) ≥ Cq if q ∈ (0, 1), (Rq(P ))
for all stopping times 0 ≤ τ ≤ T and some constant Cq > 0 independent
of τ . It is useful to recall that q < 0 corresponds to p ∈ (0, 1) and vice versa.
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Without consumption, Rq(P ) reduces to E[(YT /Yτ )q|Fτ ] ≤ Cq (resp.
the converse inequality). Inequalities of this type are well known. See, e.g.,
Doléans-Dade and Meyer [5] for an introduction or Delbaen et al. [2] and the
references therein for some connections to finance. In most applications, the
considered exponent q is greater than one; Rq(P ) then takes the form as for
q < 0. We recall once more the standing assumptions (2.4) and (2.6).
Proposition 4.5. The following are equivalent:
(i) The process L is uniformly bounded away from zero and infinity.
(ii) Inequality Rq(P ) holds for the dual minimizer Ŷ ∈ Y .
(iii) Inequality Rq(P ) holds for some Y ∈ Y .
Proof. Under the standing assumption (2.4), a one-sided bound for L always
holds by Lemma 3.5, namely L ≥ k1 if p ∈ (0, 1) and L ≤ const. if p < 0.
(i) is equivalent to (ii): We use (2.4) and then Propositions 4.3 and 4.4
to obtain that
∫ T
τ E
[
(Ŷs/Ŷτ )
q
∣∣Fτ ]µ◦(ds) = E[ ∫ Tτ (Ŷs/Ŷτ )q µ◦(ds)∣∣Fτ ] ≤
k−β1 E
[ ∫ T
τ D
β
s (Ŷs/Ŷτ )
q µ◦(ds)
∣∣Fτ ] = k−β1 L∗τ = k−β1 Lβτ . Thus when p ∈ (0, 1)
and hence q < 0, Rq(P ) for Ŷ is equivalent to an upper bound for L. For
p < 0, we replace k1 by k2.
(iii) implies (i): Assume p ∈ (0, 1). Using Propositions 4.4 and 4.3
and (4.2), −1qY
q
t L
β
t ≤ E
[ ∫ T
t U
∗
s (Ys)µ
◦(ds)
∣∣Ft] ≤ −1qkβ2 ∫ Tt E[Y qs |Ft]µ◦(ds).
Hence L ≤ k2C
−β
q . If p < 0, we obtain L ≥ k1C
−β
q in the same way.
If the equivalent conditions of Proposition 4.5 are satisfied, we say that
“Rq(P ) holds” for the given financial market model. Although quite frequent
in the literature, this condition is rather restrictive in the sense that it of-
ten fails in explicit models that have stochastic dynamics. For instance, in
the affine models of [9], L is an exponentially affine function of a typically
unbounded factor process, in which case Proposition 4.5 implies that Rq(P )
fails. Similarly, L is an exponentially quadratic function of an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process in the model of Kim and Omberg [13]. On the other
hand, exponential Lévy models have constant dynamics and here L turns
out to be simply a smooth deterministic function (see Example 6.1).
In a given model, it may be hard to check whether Rq(P ) holds. Re-
calling y0M S ⊆ Y , an obvious approach in view of Proposition 4.5(iii) is
to choose for Y/y0 the density process of some specific martingale measure.
We illustrate this with an essentially classical example.
Example 4.6. Assume that R is a special semimartingale with decomposi-
tion
R = α • 〈Rc〉+MR, (4.5)
where Rc denotes the continuous local martingale part of R, α ∈ L2loc(R
c),
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and MR is the local martingale part of R. Suppose that the process
χt :=
∫ t
0
α⊤s d〈R
c〉s αs , t ∈ [0, T ]
is uniformly bounded. Then Z := E(−α • Rc) is a martingale by Novikov’s
condition and the measure Q ≈ P with density dQ/dP = ZT is a local
martingale measure for S as ZE(R) = E(−α • Rc +MR) by Yor’s formula;
hence y0Z ∈ Y . Fix q. Using Zq = E(−qα • Rc) exp
(
1
2q(q − 1)χ
)
, and that
E(−qα • Rc) is a martingale by Novikov’s condition, one readily checks that
Z satisfies inequality Rq(P ).
If R is continuous, (4.5) is the structure condition of Schweizer [24] and
under (2.6) R is necessarily of this form. Then χ is called mean-variance
tradeoff process and Q is the “minimal” martingale measure. In Itô process
models, χ takes the form χt =
∫ t
0 θ
⊤
s θs ds, where θ is the market price of risk
process. Thus χ will be bounded whenever θ is.
Remark 4.7. The example also gives a sufficient condition for (2.5). This
is of interest only for p ∈ (0, 1) and we remark that for the case of Itô
process models with bounded θ, the condition corresponds to Karatzas and
Shreve [10, Remark 6.3.9].
Indeed, if there exists Y ∈ Y satisfying Rq(P ), then with (4.2) and (2.4)
it follows that the the value of the dual problem (4.1) is finite, and this
suffices for (2.5), as in Kramkov and Schachermayer [16].
The rest of the section studies the dependence of Rq(P ) on q.
Remark 4.8. Assume that Y satisfies Rq(P ) with a constant Cq. If q1 is
such that q < q1 < 0 or 0 < q < q1 < 1, then Rq1(P ) is satisfied with
Cq1 =
(
µ◦[0, T ]
)1−q1/q(Cq)q1/q.
Similarly, if q < 0 < q1 < 1, we can take Cq1 = (Cq)
q1/q. This follows from
Jensen’s inequality.
There is also a partial converse.
Lemma 4.9. Let 0 < q < q1 < 1 and let Y > 0 be a supermartingale. If Y
satisfies Rq1(P ), it also satisfies Rq(P ).
In particular, the following dichotomy holds: Y satisfies either all or none
of the inequalities
{
Rq(P ), q ∈ (0, 1)
}
.
Proof. From Lemma 4.10 stated below we have
∫ T
t E
[
(Ys/Yt)
q
∣∣Ft]µ◦(ds) ≥∫ T
t
(
E
[
(Ys/Yt)
q1
∣∣Ft]) 1−q1−q1 µ◦(ds). Noting that 1−q1−q1 > 1, we apply Jensen’s
inequality to the right-hand side and then use Rq1(P ) to deduce the claim
with Cq :=
(
µ◦[t, T ]
) q−q1
1−q1 (Cq1)
1−q
1−q1 . The dichotomy follows by the previous
remark.
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For future reference, we state separately the main step of the above proof.
Lemma 4.10. Let Y > 0 be a supermartingale. For fixed 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T ,
φ : (0, 1) → R+, q 7→ φ(q) :=
(
E
[
(Ys/Yt)
q
∣∣Ft]) 11−q
is a monotone decreasing function P -a.s. If in addition Y is a martingale,
then limq→1− φ(q) = exp
(
− E
[
(Ys/Yt) log(Ys/Yt)
∣∣Ft]) P -a.s., where the
conditional expectation has values in R ∪ {+∞}.
Proof. Suppose first that Y is a martingale; by scaling we may assume
E[Y.] = 1. We define a probability Q ≈ P on Fs by dQ/dP := Ys. With
r := (1− q) ∈ (0, 1) and Bayes’ formula,
φ(q) =
(
Y 1−qt E
Q
[
Y q−1s
∣∣Ft]) 11−q = Yt(EQ[(1/Ys)r∣∣Ft]) 1r .
This is increasing in r by Jensen’s inequality, hence decreasing in q.
Now let Y be a supermartingale. We can decompose it as Yu = BuMu,
u ∈ [0, s], where M is a martingale and Bs = 1. That is, Mt = E[Ys|Ft]
and Bt = Yt/E[Ys|Ft] ≥ 1, by the supermartingale property. Hence B
q/(q−1)
t
is decreasing in q ∈ (0, 1). Together with the first part, it follows that
φ(q) = B
q/(q−1)
t
(
E
[
(Ms/Mt)
q
∣∣Ft]) 11−q is decreasing.
Assume again that Y is a martingale. The limit limq→1− log
(
φ(q)
)
can
be calculated as
lim
q→1−
log
(
E
[
(Ys/Yt)
q
∣∣Ft])
1− q
= lim
q→1−
−
E
[
(Ys/Yt)
q log(Ys/Yt)
∣∣Ft]
E
[
(Ys/Yt)q
∣∣Ft] P -a.s.
using l’Hôpital’s rule and E[(Ys/Yt)|Ft] = 1. The result follows using mono-
tone and bounded convergence in the numerator and dominated convergence
in the denominator.
Remark 4.11. The limiting case q = 1 corresponds to the entropic in-
equality RL logL(P ) which reads
∫ T
τ E
[
(Ys/Yτ ) log(Ys/Yτ )
∣∣Fτ ]µ◦(ds) ≤ C1.
Lemma 4.10 shows that for a martingale Y > 0, Rq1(P ) with q1 ∈ (0, 1)
is weaker than RL logL(P ), which, in turn, is obviously weaker than Rq0(P )
with q0 > 1.
A much deeper argument [5, Proposition 5] shows that if Y is a martingale
satisfying the “condition (S)” that k−1Y− ≤ Y ≤ kY− for some k > 0, then
Y satisfies Rq0(P ) for some q0 > 1 if and only if it satisfies Rq(P ) for some
q < 0, and then by Remark 4.8 also Rq1(P ) for all q1 ∈ (0, 1).
Coming back to the utility maximization problem, we obtain the follow-
ing dichotomy from Lemma 4.9 and the implication (iii) ⇒ (ii) in Proposi-
tion 4.5.
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Corollary 4.12. For the given market model, Rq(P ) holds either for all or
no values of q ∈ (0, 1).
We believe that this equivalence of reverse Hölder inequalities is surpris-
ing and also of independent probabilistic interest.
5 Applications
In this section we consider only the case with intermediate consumption.
We assume (2.4) and (2.6). However, we remark that all results except for
Proposition 5.4 and Remark 5.5 hold true as soon as there exists an optimal
strategy (πˆ, cˆ) ∈ A.
We first show the announced feedback formula for the optimal propensity
to consume κˆ, which will then allow us to translate the results of the previous
sections into economic statements. The following theorem can be seen as a
generalization of [25, Proposition 8], which considers a Markovian model
with Itô coefficients driven by a correlated factor.
Theorem 5.1. With β = 11−p we have
cˆt =
(Dt
Lt
)β
X̂t and hence κˆt =
(Dt
Lt
)β
. (5.1)
Proof. This follows from Proposition 4.2 via (4.4) and (2.2).
Remark 5.2. In [21, Theorem 3.2, Remark 3.6] we generalize the formula
for κˆ to the utility maximization problem under constraints as described in
Remark 3.7, under the sole assumption that an optimal constrained strategy
exists. The proof relies on different techniques and is beyond the scope of
this paper; we merely mention that κˆ is unique also in that setting.
The special case where the constraints set C ⊆ Rd is linear can be de-
duced from Theorem 5.1 by redefining the price process S. For instance, set
S1 ≡ 1 for C = {(x1, . . . , xd) ∈ Rd : x1 = 0}.
In the remainder of the section we discuss how certain changes in the
model and the discounting process D affect the optimal propensity to con-
sume. This is based on (5.1) and the relation
1
px
p
0Lt = ess sup
c∈A(0,x01{T},t)
E
[ ∫ T
t
Ds
1
pc
p
s µ
◦(ds)
∣∣∣Ft], (5.2)
which is immediate from Proposition 3.1. In the present non-Markovian
setting the parametrization by the propensity to consume is crucial as one
cannot make statements for “fixed wealth”. There is no immediate way to
infer results about cˆ, except of course for the initial value cˆ0 = κˆ0x0.
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5.1 Variation of the Investment Opportunities
It is classical in economics to compare two “identical” agents with utility
function U , where only one has access to a stock market. The opportunity
to invest in risky assets gives rise to two contradictory effects. The presence
of risk incites the agent to save cash for the uncertain future; this is the
precautionary savings effect and its strength is related to the absolute pru-
dence P(U) = −U ′′′/U ′′. On the other hand, the agent may prefer to invest
rather than to consume immediately. This substitution effect is related to
the absolute risk aversion A (U) = −U ′′/U ′.
Classical economic theory (e.g., Gollier [7, Proposition 74]) states that
in a one period model, the presence of a complete financial market makes
the optimal consumption at time t = 0 smaller if P(U) ≥ 2A (U) holds
everywhere on (0,∞), and larger if the converse inequality holds. For power
utility, the former condition holds if p < 0 and the latter holds if p ∈ (0, 1).
We go a step further in the comparison by considering two different sets of
constraints, instead of giving no access to the stock market at all (which is
the constraint {0}).
Let C and C ′ be set-valued mappings of constraints as in Remark 3.7,
and let C ′ ⊆ C in the sense that C ′t (ω) ⊆ Ct(ω) for all (t, ω). Assume that
there exist corresponding optimal constrained strategies.
Proposition 5.3. Let κˆ and κˆ′ be the optimal propensities to consume for
the constraints C and C ′, respectively. Then C ′ ⊆ C implies κˆ ≤ κˆ′ if p > 0
and κˆ ≥ κˆ′ if p < 0. In particular, cˆ0 ≤ cˆ
′
0 if p > 0 and cˆ0 ≥ cˆ
′
0 if p < 0.
Proof. Let L and L′ be the corresponding opportunity processes; we make
use of Remarks 3.7 and 5.2. Consider relation (5.2) with AC instead of A
and the analogue for L′ with AC
′
. We see that AC
′
⊆ AC implies 1pL
′ ≤ 1pL,
as the supremum is taken over a larger set in the case of C . By (5.1), κˆ is a
decreasing function of L.
Proposition 5.4. The optimal propensity to consume satisfies
κˆt ≤
(k2/k1)
β
1 + T − t
if p ∈ (0, 1) and κˆt ≥
(k2/k1)
β
1 + T − t
if p < 0.
In particular, we have a model-independent deterministic threshold indepen-
dent of p in the standard case D ≡ 1,
κˆt ≤
1
1 + T − t
if p ∈ (0, 1) and κˆt ≥
1
1 + T − t
if p < 0.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 3.5 and (5.1). The second part can also be
seen as special case of Proposition 5.3 with constraint set C ′ = {0} since
then κˆ′ = (1 + T − t)−1 as in Example 3.6.
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The threshold (1 + T − t)−1 coincides with the optimal propensity to
consume for the log-utility function (cf. [6]), which formally corresponds to
p = 0. This suggests that the threshold is attained by κˆ(p) in the limit
p→ 0, a result proved in [23].
Remark 5.5. Uniform bounds for κˆ opposite to the ones in Proposition 5.4
exist if and only if Rq(P ) holds for the given financial market model. Quan-
titatively, if Cq > 0 is the constant for Rq(P ), then
κˆt ≥
(k2
k1
)β 1
Cq
if p ∈ (0, 1) and κˆt ≤
(k1
k2
)β 1
Cq
if p < 0.
This follows from (5.1) and (2.4) by (the proof of) Proposition 4.5. In view
of Corollary 4.12 we have the following dichotomy: κˆ = κˆ(p) has a uniform
upper bound either for all values of p < 0, or for none of them.
5.2 Variation of D
We now study how κˆ is affected if we increase D on some time interval
[t1, t2). To this end, let 0 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ T be two fixed points in time and ξ a
bounded càdlàg adapted process which is strictly positive and nonincreasing
on [t1, t2). In addition to Ut(x) = Dt 1px
p we consider the utility random field
U ′t(x) := D
′
t
1
px
p, D′ :=
(
1 + ξ1[t1,t2)
)
D.
As an interpretation, recall the modeling of taxation by D from Re-
mark 2.2. Then we want to find out how the agent reacts to a temporary
change of the tax policy on [t1, t2)—in particular whether a reduction of the
tax rate ̺ := D−1/p − 1 stimulates consumption. For p > 0, the next result
shows this to be true during [t1, t2), while the contrary holds before the pol-
icy change and there is no effect after t2. An agent with p < 0 reacts in the
opposite way. Remark 2.2 also suggests other interpretations of the same
result.
Proposition 5.6. Let κˆ and κˆ′ be the optimal propensities to consume for
U and U ′, respectively. Then
κˆ′t < κˆt if t < t1,
κˆ′t > κˆt if t ∈ [t1, t2),
κˆ′t = κˆt if t ≥ t2.
Proof. Let L and L′ be the opportunity processes for U and U ′. We con-
sider (5.2) and compare it with its analogue for L′, where D is replaced byD′.
As ξ > 0, we then see that L′t > Lt for t < t1; moreover, L
′
t = Lt for t ≥ t2.
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Since ξ is nonincreasing, we also see that L′t < (1+ξt)Lt for t ∈ [t1, t2). It re-
mains to apply (5.1). For t < t1, κˆ′ = (D′t/L
′
t)
β = (Dt/L
′
t)
β < (Dt/Lt)
β = κˆ.
For t ∈ [t1, t2) we have
κˆ′ = (D′t/L
′
t)
β =
((1 + ξt)Dt
L′t
)β
>
( (1 + ξt)Dt
(1 + ξt)Lt
)β
= κˆ,
while for t ≥ t2, D′t = Dt implies κˆ
′
t = κˆt.
Remark 5.7. (i) For t2 = T , the statement of Proposition 5.6 remains true
if the closed interval is chosen in the definition of D˜.
(ii) One can see [25, Proposition 12] as a special case of Proposition 5.6.
In our notation, the authors consider D = 1[0,T )K1 + 1{T}K2 for two con-
stants K1,K2 > 0 and obtain monotonicity of the consumption with respect
to the ratio K2/K1. This is proved in a Markovian setting by a comparison
result for PDEs.
6 On the Optimal Trading Strategy
In this section we indicate how the opportunity process L describes the opti-
mal trading strategy πˆ. This issue is thoroughly treated in [21] and our aim
here is only to complete the picture of how the opportunity process describes
the power utility maximization problem. The following holds whenever an
optimal strategy (πˆ, κˆ) exists and in particular when the conditions of Propo-
sition 2.3 are satisfied.
Our description for πˆ is local, i.e., we fix (ω, t) ∈ Ω × [0, T ] and char-
acterize the vector πˆt(ω) ∈ Rd. We shall see that this vector maximizes a
certain concave function g, or more precisely, a function y 7→ g(ω, t, y) on a
subset C 0t (ω) of R
d. Therefore, πˆt(ω) can be seen as the optimal control for
a deterministic control problem whose admissible controls are given by the
set C 0t (ω):
πˆt(ω) = argmax
y∈C 0t (ω)
g(ω, t, y), (ω, t) ∈ Ω× [0, T ]. (6.1)
The set C 0t (ω) is a local description for the budget constraint, i.e., the con-
dition that the wealth process X(π, κ) corresponding to some strategy (π, κ)
has to be positive.
To formally define C 0t (ω), we first have to introduce the semimartingale
characteristics of R (cf. [8, Chapter II] for background). Let h : Rd → Rd
be a cut-off function, i.e., h is bounded and h(x) = x in a neighborhood
of x = 0. Moreover, we fix a suitable increasing process A and denote by
(bR, cR, FR;A) the differential characteristics of R with respect to A and h.
In the special case where R is a Lévy process, one can choose At = t and then
(bR, cR, FR) is the familiar Lévy triplet. In general, the triplet (bR, cR, FR)
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is stochastic, but for fixed (ω, t) the interpretation is similar as in the Lévy
case. In particular, FRt (ω) is a Lévy measure on R
d and describes the jumps
of R. With this notation we can define
C
0
t (ω) :=
{
y ∈ Rd : FRt (ω)
{
x ∈ Rd : y⊤x < −1
}
= 0
}
.
This formula is related to the budget constraint because the stochastic expo-
nential X(π, κ) = x0E
(
π • R−κ • µ
)
is nonnegative if and only if the jumps
of its argument satisfy π⊤∆R ≥ −1, and this condition is expressed by the
above formula in a local way. We refer to [21, § 2.4] for a detailed discussion
and references to related literature.
It remains to specify the objective function g of the local optimiza-
tion problem (6.1). To this end, we consider the Rd × R-valued semi-
martingale (R,L). We denote a generic point in Rd × R by (x, x′) and
by (bR,L, cR,L, FR,L;A) the joint differential characteristics of (R,L) with
respect to A and the cut-off function (x, x′) 7→ (h(x), x′); here the last co-
ordinate does not require a truncation because L is special (Lemma 3.5).
Suppressing (ω, t) in the notation, we can now define
g(y) := L−y
⊤
(
bR + c
RL
L−
+ (p−1)2 c
Ry
)
+
∫
Rd×R
x′y⊤h(x)FR,L(d(x, x′))
+
∫
Rd×R
(L− + x
′)
{
p−1(1 + y⊤x)p − p−1 − y⊤h(x)
}
FR,L(d(x, x′)).
One can check (cf. [21, Appendix A]) that y 7→ g(ω, t, y) is a well defined
concave function on C 0t (ω) taking values in the extended real line. With the
above notation, and under the assumption that an optimal strategy (πˆ, κˆ)
exists, [21, Theorem 3.2] states that the local description (6.1) for πˆ holds
true P ⊗A-a.e.
We conclude by an illustration of this result in the Lévy case (see [22]
for details).
Example 6.1. Let R be a scalar Lévy process with Lévy triplet (bR, cR, FR)
such that R is neither an increasing nor a decreasing process (then the no-
arbitrage condition (2.6) is satisfied). We assume that the price process
S = E(R) is strictly positive, or equivalently that FR(−∞,−1] = 0. We
consider the standard power utility function U(x) = 1px
p and focus on the
case with intermediate consumption for simplicity of notation. For p ∈ (0, 1),
it turns out (see [22, Corollary 3.7]) that our standing assumption (2.5) is
satisfied if and only if
∫
|x|p1{|x|>1} F
R(dx) <∞, and for p < 0 we have seen
that the assumption is always satisfied.
The Lévy setting has the particular feature that the opportunity process
and the function g are deterministic. More precisely, g(ω, t, y) = Ltg(y) for
the deterministic and time-independent function
g(y) := y⊤bR + (p−1)2 y
⊤cRy +
∫
Rd
{
p−1(1 + y⊤x)p − p−1 − y⊤h(x)
}
FR(dx).
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Since L is positive, maximizing g is equivalent to maximizing g and so (6.1)
can be stated as
πˆ = argmax
y∈C 0
g(y),
where we note that C 0 is simply a subset of R because FR is deterministic
and time-independent. In particular, the optimal trading strategy πˆ is given
by a constant. Moreover, setting a := p1−p maxy∈C 0 g(y), the explicit formula
for the opportunity process is
Lt = a
p−1
[
(1 + a)ea(T−t) − 1
]1−p
and then by (5.1) the optimal propensity to consume is
κˆt = 1/L
1/(1−p)
t = a
[
(1 + a)ea(T−t) − 1
]−1
.
We refer to [22, Theorem 3.2] for the proof and references to related litera-
ture.
A Dynamic Programming
This appendix collects the facts about dynamic programming which are
used in this paper. Recall the standing assumption (2.5), the set A(π, c, t)
from (3.1) and the process J from (3.2). We begin with the lattice property.
Fact A.1. Fix (π, c) ∈ A and let Γt(c˜) := E[
∫ T
t Us(c˜s)µ
◦(ds)|Ft]. The set
{Γt(c˜) : c˜ ∈ A(π, c, t)} is upward filtering for each t ∈ [0, T ].
Indeed, if (πi, ci) ∈ A(π, c, t), i = 1, 2, we have Γt(c1) ∨ Γt(c2) = Γt(c3)
for (π3, c3) := (π1, c1)1A + (π2, c2)1Ac with A := {Γt(c1) > Γt(c2)}. Clearly
(π3, c3) ∈ A(π, c, t). Regarding Remark 3.7, we note that π3 satisfies the
constraints if π1 and π2 do.
Proposition A.2. Let (π, c) ∈ A and It(π, c) := Jt(π, c) +
∫ t
0 Us(cs)µ(ds).
If E[ |It(π, c)| ] < ∞ for each t, then I(π, c) is a supermartingale having a
càdlàg version. It is a martingale if and only if (π, c) is optimal.
Proof. The technique of proof is well known; see El Karoui and Quenez [12]
or Laurent and Pham [17] for arguments in different contexts.
We fix (π, c) ∈ A as well as 0 ≤ t ≤ u ≤ T and prove the supermartin-
gale property. Note that It(π, c) = ess supc˜∈A(pi,c,t)Υt(c˜) for the martingale
Υt(c˜) := E
[ ∫ T
0 Us(c˜s)µ
◦(ds)
∣∣Ft]. (More precisely, the expectation is well
defined with values in R ∪ {−∞} by (2.5).)
As Υu(c˜) = Γu(c˜) +
∫ u
0 Us(c˜s)µ(ds), Fact A.1 implies that there exists
a sequence (cn) in A(π, c, u) such that limnΥu(cn) = Iu(π, c) P -a.s., where
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the limit is monotone increasing in n. We conclude that
E[Iu(π, c)|Ft] = E[lim
n
Υu(c
n)|Ft] = lim
n
E[Υu(c
n)|Ft]
≤ ess supc˜∈A(pi,c,u)E[Υu(c˜)|Ft] = ess supc˜∈A(pi,c,u)Υt(c˜)
≤ ess supc˜∈A(pi,c,t)Υt(c˜) = It(π, c).
To construct the càdlàg version, denote by I ′ the process obtained by
taking the right limits of t 7→ It(π, c) =: It through the rational numbers,
with I ′T := IT . Since I is a supermartingale and the filtration satisfies the
“usual assumptions”, these limits exist P -a.s., I ′ is a (càdlàg) supermartin-
gale, and I ′t ≤ It P -a.s. (see Dellacherie and Meyer [4, IV.1.2]). But in fact,
equality holds here because for all (π˜, c˜) ∈ A(π, c, t) we have
Υt(c˜) = E
[ ∫ T
0
Us(c˜s) dµ
◦
∣∣∣Ft] = E[IT (π˜, c˜)|Ft] = E[IT |Ft] ≤ I ′t
due to IT = I ′T , and hence also I
′
t ≥ ess supc˜∈A(pi,c,t)Υt(c˜) = It. Therefore I
′
is a càdlàg version of I.
We turn to the martingale property. Let (π, c) be optimal, then I0(π, c) =
Υ0(π, c) = E[IT (π, c)], so the supermartingale I(π, c) is a martingale. Con-
versely, this relation states that (π, c) is optimal, by definition of I(π, c).
The following property was used in the body of the text.
Fact A.3. Consider (π, c), (π′, c′) ∈ A with corresponding wealths Xt,X ′t at
time t ∈ [0, T ] and (π′′, c′′) ∈ A(π′, c′, t). Then
c1[0,t] +
Xt
X ′t
c′′ 1(t,T ] ∈ A(π, c, t).
Indeed, for the trading strategy π1[0,t] + π′′1(t,T ], the corresponding wealth
process is X1[0,t] +
Xt
X′t
X ′′1(t,T ] > 0 by (2.1).
B Martingale Property of the Optimal Processes
The purpose of this appendix is to provide a statement which follows from [11]
and is known to its authors, but which we could not find in the literature.
For the case without intermediate consumption, the following assertion is
contained in [15, Theorem 2.2].
Lemma B.1. Assume (2.4) and (2.6). Let (π, c) ∈ A, X = X(π, c) and
Y ∈ Y D , then
Zt := XtYt +
∫ t
0
csYs µ(ds), t ∈ [0, T ]
is a supermartingale. If (X, c, Y ) = (X̂, cˆ, Ŷ ) are the optimal processes solv-
ing the primal and the dual problem, respectively, then Z is a martingale.
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Proof. It follows from [11, Theorem 3.10(vi)] that E[ZT ] = E[Z0] for the
optimal processes, so it suffices to prove the first part.
(i) Assume first that Y ∈ Y M , i.e., Y/Y0 is the density process of a
measure Q ≈ P . As Y M ⊆ Y ∗, the process X+
∫
cu µ(du) = x0+
∫
X−π dR
is a Q-supermartingale, that is, EQ[Xt +
∫ t
0 cu µ(du)|Fs] ≤ Xs +
∫ s
0 cu µ(du)
for s ≤ t. We obtain the claim by Bayes’ rule,
E
[
XtYt +
∫ t
s
cuYu µ(du)
∣∣∣Fs] ≤ XsYs.
(ii) Let Y ∈ Y D be arbitrary, then by [11, Corollary 2.11] there is
a sequence Y n ∈ Y M which Fatou-converges to Y . Consider the super-
martingale Y ′ := lim infn Y n. By Žitković [28, Lemma 8], Y ′t = Yt P -a.s.
for all t in a (dense) subset Λ ⊆ [0, T ] which contains T and whose comple-
ment is countable. It follows from Fatou’s lemma and step (i) that Z is a
supermartingale on Λ; indeed, for s ≤ t in Λ,
E
[
XtYt +
∫ t
s
cuYu µ(du)
∣∣∣Fs] = E[XtY ′t + ∫ t
s
cuY
′
u µ(du)
∣∣∣Fs]
≤ lim inf
n
E
[
XtY
n
t +
∫ t
s
cuY
n
u µ(du)
∣∣∣Fs]
≤ lim inf
n
XsY
n
s = XsYs P -a.s.
We can extend Z|Λ to [0, T ] by taking right limits in Λ and obtain a right-
continuous supermartingale Z ′ on [0, T ], by right-continuity of the filtration.
But Z ′ is indistinguishable from Z because Z is also right-continuous. Hence
Z is a supermartingale as claimed.
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